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Comments
"FUNDAMENTAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE":
THE SUPREME COURT'S VERSION OF
THE 'TRULY NEEDY" IN SECTION
2254 HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEEDINGS
The circumstances under which a state prisoner may challenge
his or her conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding when there
has been procedural default at trial have been hotly contested
since the Warren Court's landmark decision in Fay v. Noia two
decades ago. In Engle v. Isaa, however, the Supreme Court laid
the Fay v. Noia test to rest and established a strict burden for
state prison inmates seeking federal habeas review of their con-
victions. This Comment examines the issues surrounding this de-
bate, focusing on the decision in Engle v. Isaac.
INTRODUCTION
Suppose the cases of Smith and Jones. Each man is charged
with aggravated assault and each claims self-defense. Smith, an
indigent, is assigned an attorney from the public defender's office
whose caseload averages between thirty-five to forty cases.'
Jones is considerably better off and so employs the services of a
well-known criminal lawyer who handles few cases, but all for a
rather substantial fee.
1. This figure is hardly atypical for public defender organizations. See, e.g., L.
BENNER AND B. NEARY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973); Benner, Tokenism and
the American Indigent- Some Perspectives on Defense Services, 12 Am. CR. L. REV.
667 (1975); Wice & Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs: A Na-
tional Survey and Analysis, 10 Cane L Bumr- 161 (1974).
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The state in which the two defendants are tried has for over a
century placed the burden of establishing affirmative defenses on
the accused. This has entailed both the burden of producing evi-
dence, and the burden of persuasion measured by a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.2 There have been recent changes
in the state's criminal code, but the courts of this state, including
the state supreme court, have held that these changes have not
altered the traditional rules concerning affirmative defenses.
When the jury is instructed regarding the burdens of proving af-
firmative defenses, no objection is raised by Smith's counsel, for
in counsel's opinion objection would be futile. Jones' counsel,
however, renowned for his incessant constitutional assaults, ob-
jects to the instructions on the grounds that due process of law
requires the prosecution to disprove affirmative defenses beyond
a reasonable doubt once the defendant meets the burden of pro-
ducing evidence on the issue.3 Although the objection is over-
ruled because it appears contrary to state law, the objection is
preserved on the record.
Both Smith and Jones are convicted. On appeal the convictions
are affirmed, Jones again raising his constitutional claim to no
avail. One year after the final appeals have taken place and the
defendants have been sentenced to state prison, the supreme
court of the state decides that it has misconstrued its own statute.
The court now concludes that once a defendant produces some
evidence in support of his claim of affirmative defense, the prose-
cution must indeed refute the claim beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. For an excellent analysis distinguishing the burden of persuasion from the
burden of producing evidence, see Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of
Presumptions, 52 ICH. L. REV. 195 (1953); J. THAYER, A PREImuNARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT CoioN LAw (1898).
3. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1573-74 (1982), in which the Court inti-
mates that because In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), would support such a claim,
that is, that due process of law prohibits the states from ever assigning the burden
of persuasion to criminal defendants raising affirmative defenses, that counsel for
defendants such as Smith cannot justify their failure to raise the very objection
asserted by Jones' counsel This exact claim was raised in Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977), in which the Court stated: "We thus decline to adopt as a con-
stitutional imperative, operative country-wide, that a State must disprove beyond
a reasonable doubt ... all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an ac-
cused .... Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been
constitutionally required, and we perceived no reason to fashion such a rule
[here].... [Furthermore], [tjhis was not the problem to which Winship was ad-
dressed." Id. at 210, 211 (emphasis added).
In light of this language it is difficult to understand how the Court could insist
that counsel's failure to raise precisely the same claim as that presented in Patter-
son constituted an inexcusable procedural default. See also Underwood, The
Thumb On the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86
YALE L.J. 1299 (1977); Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After Pat-
terson v. New York, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 665 (1978).
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Both men petition for relief under the federal habeas corpus stat-
ute,4 alleging that they have been denied due process of law and
thus are in custody in violation of the United States Constitution.5
Jones' petition is granted, and at his new trial with the state
rather than the defendant bearing the burden of proof, Jones is
acquitted. Smith's petition, citing as authority the ruling in Jones'
case, is denied, the court holding that Smith's failure to abide by
the state's contemporaneous objection rule to jury instructions
precludes his right to obtain federal habeas review unless he can
meet the "cause" and "prejudice" standards enunciated in Wain-
wright v. Sykes.6 Smith argues that he has met the cause require-
ment in that he cannot be charged with "inexcusable procedural
default ' 7 for a claim which did not even exist at the time of his
trial and for which an objection would obviously have been futile
even if he had perceived the claim. He further contends that his
case was prejudiced because, as the United States Supreme Court
recognized in Speiser v. Randall,8 the allocation of the burden of
proof is often outcome determinative. The district court rejects
these arguments, however, and issuance of the writ is denied.
Smith's case reaches the United States Supreme Court which
affirms the denial of his writ. Although the Court accepts Smith's
claim that he was prejudiced by the wrongful allocation of the
burden of proof, the Court nevertheless rejects his offer of proof
on the issue of cause. The Court decides that although the claim
might not have been raised in Smith's state prior to Jones' case, it
had been raised in other states, albeit unsuccessfully. Smith's at-
torney could not, therefore, argue that he lacked the "tools to con-
struct"9 such a claim. Smith, guilty of procedural default, is thus
barred from habeas review of his admittedly "colorable"10 claim.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Federal habeas corpus is available for state pris-
oners only if they are in custody in violation of the federal constitution, federal
laws, or federal treaties. In practice it is generally restricted to custody in viola-
tion of the federal constitution.
6. 453 U.S. 72 (1977) (defendant barred from habeas review of his Miranda
claim unless able to demonstrate "cause" for the failure to object to the introduc-
tion of a confession, and actual "prejudice" resulting thereby).
7. Id. at 89 n.13 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 513 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
8. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). "In all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the bur-
den of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome." Id. at 525.
9. 102 S. Ct. at 1574.
10. Id. at 1575.
Compounding Smith's problems, the Court also states that while
it does not require criminal counsel to possess "extraordinary vi-
sion,"" Smith has not been denied effective assistance of counsel,
for "[not] every astute counsel"12 would necessarily have raised
the objection. Thus, based on identical evidence and identical cir-
cumstances, Smith goes back to prison while Jones is a free man.
Before the April 5, 1982 Supreme Court decision in Engle v.
Isaac,13 such a result would have offended the traditional princi-
ples upon which the Great Writ rests. That the writ of habeas
corpus would ever be ruled by an absolutist doctrine of form over
substance would have been unthinkable as little as ten years ago.
Although procedural default might bar federal review of certain
claims,14 an allegation of wrongful allocation of the burden of
proof, which goes to the heart of the determination of guilt or in-
nocence, was precisely the sort of claim that habeas corpus was
designed to remedy. 5 In Engle v. Isaac, however, the Supreme
Court per Justice O'Connor swept aside any distinctions between
procedural defaults not affecting the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence, and the failure to object to defects in trial procedure
inextricably related to the truthfinding function. The Court held
that a claim once forfeited through default not only bars review of
the claim on direct appeal, but also bars it from federal habeas re-
view unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the failure
to object, and prejudice resulting thereby.16
Just as in Wainurright v. Sykes,17 however, the Court refused to
give "precise content" to the terms "cause" and "prejudice." Al-
though the Court failed to breathe any meaning into its new stan-
dard, the Court did imply that prejudice is met only by showing
that a different verdict would have obtained had counsel's objec-
tion been raised and sustained. As for the cause standard, the
Court's only guidance was to state what cause was not. Cause is
not met by demonstrating the inadvertence, ignorance or inatten-
tiveness of counsel.18 Nor is cause met by demonstrating that an
objection would have been futile, or that the claim did not exist at
the time of trial.19 In fact, cause is not met so long as the Court
11. Id. at 1573.
12. Id. at 1574.
13. 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (claim of violation of
equal protection of the composition of the grand jury which handed down the
indictment).
15. See, e.g., 102 S. Ct. at 1582-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
17. 453 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
18. 102 S. Ct. at 1572 n.34.
19. Id. at 1573 n.36.
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"cannot say that [the petitioner] lacked the tools to construct his
constitutional claim," however primitive the tools and however in-
choate the claim.20 As Justice Brennan retorted in dissent, "I pre-
dict that on the Court's present view it will prove easier for a
camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner
to show 'cause.' "21
This Comment examines how the Great Writ came to occupy
such an insignificant role in the protection of federal constitu-
tional rights, and the practical as well as theoretical ramifications
of the decision in Engle v. Isaac. The first section of the Com-
ment canvasses the arguments for and against an expanded writ.
The second section examines the case law following the Warren
Court's landmark decision in Fay v. Noia,22 in which the cause
and prejudice standard evolved. The final section examines the
decision in Engle v. Isaac itself, and its effect on the law of
habeas corpus.
DRAWING THE BATrLE LINES: ARGumENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN
EXPANDED WRI
"No aspect of the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts has
been as controversial as habeas corpus jurisdiction, [particularly]
habeas jurisdiction for inmates of state prisons."23 The question
of whether and when a federal district court should upset a state
conviction because of the failure to enforce the petitioner's consti-
tutional rights is an issue that has sharply divided the legal com-
munity since 1867 when federal habeas corpus was first held
applicable to state prisoners. 24 However, if one examines the
literature on habeas corpus, both case law and commentary, one
can distill a distinct number of arguments for and against an ex-
panded writ.
The arguments against an expansive writ fall into five main cat-
egories: 1) federalism; 2) comity; 3) finality/judicial efficiency;
20. Id. at 1574.
21. Id. at 1580.
22. 373 U.S. 391 (1963).
23. Chisun, In Defense of Modern Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
21 DEPAUL L. REV. 682, 682 (1972). Habeas corpus, simply put, is a judicial order
directing an official having custody of another to bring that person forward so that
the court may inquire into the legality of that person's detention. It is viewed as a
civil rather than a criminal proceeding because it is not part of the original crimi-
nal action in which the issue of guilt or innocence was determined.
24. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
4) the "flood" argument; and 5) the intent of the framers. The ar-
guments in favor of an expansive writ, on the other hand, include:
1).the supremacy argument; 2) the "correct" determination of fed-
eral constitutional rights in an absolute sense; 3) continuing avail-
ability of a mechanism for relief; 4) the expanded due process
argument; and 5) federal rights are best determined in a federal
forum. The following is a brief summary of these arguments.
Federalism
The federalism argument, which underlies all of the Burger
Court's decisions on habeas corpus, 25 has as its basic tenet the
notion that the federal government should rarely intervene in the
states' administration of their own criminal justice systems. To
be sure, notions of federalism are not restricted to matters affect-
ing criminal justice. Federalism, rather, pervades the entire
American governmental structure. This arrangement creates a
tension between the two competing systems, the states' system
and the federal system, each claiming the right to have the last
word on matters of importance.
This argument, best typified by the 1976 decision in Stone v.
Powell,26 is that so long as the states have provided an opportu-
nity for "full and fair litigation"27 of an issue, there is no reason to
assume that a state court will not enforce federal constitutional
claims to the same extent as would a federal district court.
The first counterargument to this doctrine is that the Constitu-
tion is the supreme law of the land.28 Any intrusion that takes
place when a federal habeas court finds that a particular state tri-
bunal has misperceived federal rights takes place only because
that state has failed to give federal constitutional rights the re-
spect they are due.
The second counterargument is that federal rights are best de-
termined in a federal forum. History refutes the notion that state
court judges are as zealously concerned about the protection of
federal constitutional rights as are federal district court judges.2 9
25. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976).
26. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
27. Id. at 482.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL 2.
29. The attempt by lawyers to use an ostensibly outcome-neutral federal-
ism analysis to influence indirectly the merits of constitutional litigation is
hardly new. During the past century, litigators have consistently ad-
vanced ostensibly outcome-neutral arguments, assertedly unrelated to the
merits, to channel constitutional adjudication into forums calculated to ad-
vance the substantive interests of their clients. Although the political per-
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A number of factors lead to significant institutional differences
between state court judges as a class, and federal district court
judges as a class. It is here argued that these class distinctions
manifest themselves in the relative degree of receptivity to vigor-
ous enforcement of constitutional rights which the two benches
are likely to bring to bear on any particular case.
First and foremost among the factors which distinguish the two
benches is the federal judiciary's insulation from the majoritarian
pressures which plague a state trial judge.30 Federal judges enjoy
life tenure and hence need not concern themselves with pleasing
constituents as do state court judges who face regular intervals at
the polls. Especially in times like these when the public is beat-
ing the drums of law and order, a federal judge is more likely to
uphold a valid constitutional claim irrespective of how unpopular
the decision may be than his or her state counterpart.31
Second, "the level of technical competence which the federal
district court is likely to bring to the legal issues involved will
generally be superior to that of a given state trial forum."32 Sev-
eral factors contribute to this. Federal district judges are paid al-
most double the salary of state superior court judges.3 3 Although
at first blush this may appear to be a trivial point, some incentive
other than prestige is required to draw qualified members of the
bar away from lucrative law practices to the bench. Moreover, be-
cause of its relative size, the federal trial bench is able to main-
tain a level of competence in its pool of potential appointees
suasion and economic status of the constitutional litigants have varied
with the changing nature of the rights invoked, one factor has remained
constant: interests and groups seeking expansive definition and vigorous
application of federal constitutional rights have sought a federal judicial
forum while their opponents, attempting to narrow federal rights and
weaken their implementation, have emphasized the facially neutral feder-
alism concerns which argue in favor of state judicial enforcement of fed-
eral constitutional rights.
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977).
30. The significance of the federal judiciary's independence has been noted.
See, e.g., Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes
From History, 36 U. Cm L. REV. 665, 667 (1969) ("[w]ithout their independence,
the federal judges will have lost all that separates them from total subordination
to the political processes from which they ought to be aloof").
31. Neuborne, supra note 29, at 1118-21.
32. Id. at 1120.
33. As of 1977, federal district court judges were earning $54,500 a year for life,
35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 268, 334 (1977), while the average state superior court
judge was making $33,823 per year. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SURVEY
OF JuDicIAL SALARIEs iN THE STATE COURT SYSTEMS 4 (1976).
which simply cannot be matched by the states which must staff
enormous judicial departments. 34 For example, the State of Cali-
fornia alone has almost twice as many trial judges as does the en-
tire federal system.35 In addition, federal district court judges are
provided with law clerks who are generally recruited from the
cream of the law school graduating crop to work for periods of
one to two years. State superior court judges, on the other hand,
generally rely on clerks of the court who are permanent members
of that vast body of civil servants who perform support services
for the court.
Third is the factor which Professor Neuborne refers to as "psy-
chological set."36 Neuborne argues that:
[A]n elite tradition animates the federal judiciary, instilling elan and a
sense of mission in federal judges, and exerting, as Judge Friendly has
noted, a palpable influence on the quality of the judicial product. As heirs
of a tradition of constitutional enforcement, federal judges feel subtle, yet
nonetheless real pressures to uphold that tradition. State trial judges, on
the other hand, generally seem to lack a comparable sense of tradition or
institutional mission.3 7
Finally, a federal judge may lack the cynicism that so often
marks the state trial judge who has been present throughout the
proceedings. Removed from the drama of the trial whose main
emphasis was the question of guilt or innocence, the federal dis-
trict judge can apply controlling constitutional principles in a
much more dispassionate manner.38
The third counterargument is that conflict between state and
federal courts need not be viewed as dysfunctional. Rather, such
conflict can be viewed as engendering a dialogue between state
courts and their federal counterparts in which the Constitution is
further refined and interpreted. The doctrine of dialectical feder-
alism, first put forward by Professor Cover of Yale University, is
premised on the notion that conflict between state and federal
courts is a positive, not negative, feature of our system. To avoid
state/federal conflict by eliminating certain issues from habeas
review, 39 or by erecting procedural hurdles whose effect is to re-
34. Neuborne, supra note 29, at 1121.
35. In California there are 1,108 trial judges: 503 superior court judges, 406 mu-
nicipal court judges, and 199 justices of the peace. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFOR-
NiA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AD IsmTrVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 98,
125, 133 (1976). The federal bench, in contrast, consists of 399 authorized judge-
ships and 109 senior district judges who continue to render service at the trial
level. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINsTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 2 (1976).
36. Neubome, supra note 29, at 1124.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1125-26.
39. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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strict the availability of habeas corpus,4 0 is to infringe on this dia-
logue and thus to stunt development and articulation of
constitutional rights.4 1
Comity
The comity argument is essentially a subset of the federalism
argument in that its main concern is still the relationship be-
tween federal and state courts. However, the comity argument
adds a new twist to the federalism argument. The gist of this doc-
trine is that it is "unseemly"42 for a federal district court to inter-
vene and tell a state court that it has committed error of
constitutional dimensions, that is, that state court determinations
deserve more respect.
Those who argue for an expansive writ give little weight to com-
ity concerns for two reasons. The first is that comity is ade-
quately served by the exhaustion requirement of section 2254.43
This requirement allows states the opportunity to employ their
full corrective processes to the petitioner's claim. But ultimately,
if the states fail to vindicate federal constitutional rights, they no
longer have any valid interest in preventing a federal court from
stepping in and ensuring that defendants receive the rights due
them under the Constitution.
The second argument asks whose interests should prevail?
Should it be the interests of the state judiciaries concerned with
an affront to dignity, or the interests of defendants jailed because
they were denied constitutional rights? In fact, advocates of an
expansive writ point out that the comity argument is really a red
herring, in that less than one percent of all habeas petitions are
successful, and thus the chances of a state trial judge actually be-
ing overruled on habeas corpus are miniscule. 44
40. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
41. Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
42. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 505 (1963).
43. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), a state prisoner must exhaust all available
state remedies before pursuing federal habeas corpus. See Rose v. Lundy, 102 S.
Ct. 1198 (1982).
44. Chisum, supra note 23, at 693; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES CouRrs 399 (1980) (table C5B).
Finality
The arguments for and against finality as a factor in determin-
ing the scope of habeas corpus traditionally reflect deeply held
value considerations. The primary argument in favor of finality is
that for practical reasons a line must be drawn somewhere. The
petitioner had his chance to be heard at trial, he or she has been
afforded at least one appeal, and unless one is inherently suspi-
cious of the judicial system there is no reason to believe that the
determination of the defendant's claim has not been correctly de-
cided within the limits of human fallibility.
The first counterargument to this proposition is that it is not
merely the opportunity to be heard that is important; what is par-
amount is the correct resolution of the federal constitutional right
at issue. Case law is replete with instances in which the peti-
tioner was unable to vindicate constitutional rights until a federal
habeas proceeding intervened on his behalf.45 Furthermore, as
long as the petitioner is being held in custody in violation of his
or her constitutional rights, not only does the state lack a valid in-
terest in keeping the petitioner there, but it would be in direct
conflict with congressional intent as manifested by the language
of the habeas corpus statute4 6 to restrict the availability of habeas
corpus in the name of finality.
The second argument in favor of restricting the scope of habeas
corpus under the doctrine of finality revolves around the question
of rehabilitation. Justice O'Connor raises this argument in Engle
v. Isaac,47 in which, relying on two law review articles written by
Judge Friendly48 and Professor Paul Bator 49 respectively, she
states that the "absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and
rehabilitation."50 It frustrates deterrence because "[d]eterrence
45. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel as made applicable to the states in Gideon v. Wainwright not gov-
erned by classification of offense as felony or misdemeanor, nor is it governed by
whether or not a jury trial is required); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (vol-
untariness of confession must be determined outside presence of the jury); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege held applicable to the
states); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigents entitled to appointed
counsel for appeals of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's
right to counsel in criminal cases applied to the states); Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 263 (1963) (requirement of "in custody" for 28 U.S.C. § 2241 not defeated when
state prisoner is placed on parole); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigents
entitled to transcript of trial for appeals of right); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938) (waiver of right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976).
47. 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 n.32.
48. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack On Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHL L. REV. 142 (1970).
49. Bator, supra note 42, at 441.
50. 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 n.32.
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depends on the expectation that 'one violating the law will swiftly
and certainly be subject to punishment.' "51 Rehabilitation is sim-
ilarly undermined because "[riehabilitation demands that the
convicted defendant realize 'that he is justly subject to sanction,
that he stands in need of rehabilitation2 "52 Whatever might be
the merits of these two arguments, neither is supported by empir-
ical evidence. On the contrary, the current data strongly suggests
that the availability of a continuing mechanism for relief is in it-
self rehabilitative.53 For many state prisoners, pursuing federal
habeas corpus represents the first attempt to stay within the con-
fines of "the system."5 4 In fact, 82.4 percent of correctional per-
sonnel nationwide believe that prison legal services contribute to
the rehabilitative prospects of an inmate by providing positive ex-
periences with the law and the legal system.55 Eighty-five percent
of this same group believed that the pursuit of legal avenues of
relief tends to decrease inmate hostility toward the institution.56
Over ninety percent believed that legal services help in reducing
inmate tensions caused by unresolved legal problems.57
Flood
At first blush it would appear that the flood argument repre-
sents the key issue in this controversy. For, the argument runs,
were it not for the tremendous number of prisoner petitions inun-
dating the federal courts, it is at least conceivable that none of the
other issues (federalism, finality, comity) would arise. In examin-
ing this particular argument, however, it is essential to keep in
mind the need to rely on empirical data. One cannot simply ar-
gue that the federal courts must do something to stem the tide of
habeas petitions crashing on the shores of the federal courts
without first looking at the statistics which should naturally form
the basis of that argument.
In 1970, approximately 149,677 actions were commenced in the
51. Id
52. Id.
53. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PERSPECTIVES ON PRISON LEGAL
SERVICES: NEEDS, IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LAW SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT,
SUMMARY REPORT (1972).
54. Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1968).
55. See UNITED STATES DEPT OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 10.
56. Id at 14.
57. Id.
federal courts.58 Of these, seven percent (10,663) were petitions
for habeas corpus fied by prisoners throughout the United
States.59 In the ten years following 1970, however, while the busi-
ness of the federal courts has almost doubled,60 the number of pe-
titions for habeas corpus has decreased by twenty-one percent.61
Thus, in 1980, approximately 273,950 actions were commenced in
the federal courts,62 of which only three percent, or 8,444 actions,
represented petitions for habeas corpus.63 In light of these statis-
tics it is hardly tenable to argue that the federal courts are in des-
perate straits due to the number of prisoners' petitions
"inundating" the federal docket; a fortiori when one considers
that some ninety-eight percent of these petitions are summarily
dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.64
Moreover, in a separate line of cases,65 notably never cited in
any of the Court's habeas decisions regarding procedural default,
the Supreme Court has established that an inmate has a constitu-
tionally enforceable right of access to the courts. 66 Given this
right of access to the courts, advocates of the flood argument are
like the proverbial man shouting against the storm: no matter
how much of a chore these petitions may represent, there is no
way to stem the tide, at least at the federal district court level,
without overruling all of the right of access cases.67
58. ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 234, 235 (1970).
59. Id.
60. A! NuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE




64. Of 1,785 section 2254 petitions filed in the first six months of 1982, only 42
received an evidentiary hearing. Of 1,109 section 2255 petitions filed in the same
period, only 8 received evidentiary hearings. Telephone interview with J. McCaf-
ferty of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Oct. 18, 1982). Simi-
lar figures are reported for previous years in table C5B of the 1970 through 1980
versions of the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
65. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wolff v: McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971).
66. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Court held that "'meaningful
access' to the courts is the touchstone of this right which is founded in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 823.
67. The arguments for and against the '"ood" doctrine are best summed up in
two quotes. The first is from Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Broum v. Al-
len: "He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the atti-
tude that the needle is not worth the search." 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953). The second
is from an article on pro se writs written by Allen Krause. "As hard and unre-
warding as screening these petitions may be, each deserves attention; the sensitiv-
ity which we apply to the task will be a measure of our own devotion to due
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Intent of the Framers
Those who favor a restrictive form of the writ have often raised
the argument that at the time habeas corpus was written into the
Constitution6 8 its only function was to determine whether the
sentencing court had jurisdiction over both the offense and the
defendant.69 Although this point of history has been contested,70
the mere raising of the argument obfuscates the real issue. There
are a number of reasons why the state of habeas law in 1789 is ir-
relevant to an inquiry of how broad its scope should be nearly
two hundred years later in 1982. Foremost among these is the fact
that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause was not writ-
ten until some seventy-five years after the ratification of the Con-
stitution.71 If the number of rights available to an accused are
significantly increased (as they have been under the due process
clause) and yet habeas is forced to remain confined to its form of
two centuries ago, the result is that the relationship between
rights and remedies becomes seriously skewed. The mere exist-
ence of rights means nothing if there is no mechanism for enforc-
ing them.
Moreover, the "intent of the framers" argument is dangerously
misleading. The Constitution was enacted at a time when the
practices of slavery and male supremacy existed almost unques-
tioned. As a society, this country has progressed far beyond what
was even imaginable in 1789. The nation's legal institutions and
practices must necessarily reflect some of that progress.
EVOLUTION OF THE CAUSE AND PREJUDICE STANDARD
In 1963 the Warren Court decided the landmark case of Fay v.
Noia.72 Noia had been convicted with two codefendants of felony
murder. Their convictions were obtained solely on the basis of
their uncorroborated confessions. Noia's two confederates ap-
pealed their convictions, but because of certain remarks made by
process of law." Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ Writing, 56 CALF. IL REV. 371,
371 (1968).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9.
69. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., id. at 404-06.
71. The fourteenth amendment was ratified only months after federal habeas
corpus was held applicable to the states. Arguably, both measures represent at-
tempts to establish the supremacy of the federal government over the states.
72. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
the sentencing judge, Noia did not appeal his conviction.73 Ulti-
mately, the two codefendants were set free after it was deter-
mined that their confessions had been unlawfully coerced. After
Noia had been sentenced to life imprisonment, and after the stat-
utory time for appeal had lapsed, Noia initiated habeas corpus
proceedings. His petition alleged that his conviction could not
stand for the same reason that his confederates' cases were over-
turned, namely that his confession had been improperly obtained.
Reversing the dismissal of his petition by the lower courts, the
Supreme Court per Justice Brennan held that Noia was entitled
to relief under federal habeas corpus. The Court held that the ex-
haustion of remedies requirement of section 2241 referred only to
remedies still available to the petitioner.74 More importantly, the
Court held that persons cannot be deemed to have waived their
rights because of procedural default unless it clearly appears that
for tactical or other reasons they have "deliberately bypassed"
available state procedures. 5 Furthermore, the Court held that
"the classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst
4.. 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege'--furnishes the controlling standard."76 To em-
phasize that it would not tolerate the forfeiture of fundamental
constitutional rights without the accused even being aware of the
loss, the Court stated, "[a]t all events we wish it clearly under-
stood that the standard here put forth depends on the considered
choice of the petitioner."77 Thus the deliberate bypass standard
was created.
Several issues should be noted concerning Noia. First, its un-
derlying premise is that an accused should not suffer the fate of
forfeiting important constitutional rights simply because of the in-
advertence or negligence of counsel. Unlike the Burger Court's
recent decisions concerning habeas corpus and procedural de-
fault,78 the Noia Court required that the waiver of constitutional
rights be a personal decision based upon an understanding of the
possible consequences. Second, the Court held that whatever
deference notions of federalism and comity require, they were ad-
equately served by the statutory requirement of exhaustion of
remedies. The Noia Court believed that federal constitutional
73. The judge all but assured Noia that if he appealed he would receive the
death penalty, id. at 396 n.3, a situation which Justice Brennan referred to as a
"grisly choice." Id. at 440.
74. Id. at 399.
75. Id. at 438.
76. Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 253 (1973).
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rights could never be subverted by state procedural law. The
Constitution, after all, is the supreme law of the land. Finally, the
Court noted that its decision would not cause undue friction be-
tween the state and federal judiciaries, for "[t]hose few who are
ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously
wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough
compensation." 79
Ten years after the Warren Court decided Fay v. Noia, the Bur-
ger Court decided the first of four cases that would ultimately
lead to the evisceration of the deliberate bypass standard, and its
replacement with the very restrictive cause and prejudice stan-
dard. All four of these cases deal with the notion of procedural
default and its effect on a federal habeas court's power8O to review
state prisoners' claims. Before reviewing these four decisions, it
should be noted that central to the Warren Court's approach to
habeas corpus was the notion that form should rarely rule sub-
stance.81 A procedural default would not bar a state prisoner's
opportunity for federal review unless he had deliberately by-
passed the procedure.
In contrast, the Burger Court's outlook has shifted to one of ab-
solute reverence of form over substance. A failure to object at
trial will be fatal, and only where the Court is convinced that a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice"82 has occurred will it
intervene.
In Davis v. United States,83 the Court held that a federal pris-
oner challenging, by means of habeas corpus, the composition of
the grand jury that indicted him, must establish "cause" for his
failure to have raised that objection before trial as required under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) (2). A federal prisoner
who is unable to establish cause will be barred from obtaining
federal review of his habeas petition.8 4
79. 372 U.S. at 440-41.
80. Although even in Isaac the Court states that its decision does not affect a
federal court's power to review state habeas petitions, but rather, merely restricts
the appropriate exercise of that power, the term is used here for want of a better
word.
81. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963).
82. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 (1982).
83. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
84. Davis, a federal prisoner, filed his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1976), the federal counterpart to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
Although Davis appears to be a radical departure from the de-
liberate bypass standard of Fay, Davis was actually decided on
very narrow grounds. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
12(b) (2) required that all objections to the composition of the
grand jury be raised before trial. However, for "cause shown" a
federal court could still entertain an untimely claim of illegal
make-up of the grand jury.
The Court based the decision in Davis on "the normal rules of
statutory construction,"85 which "clearly"86 indicated that when
faced with a conflict between a general statute (section 2255) and
a specific statute (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) (2)),
the specific statute controls. Because Congress had not dealt
with waiver under the federal habeas statute, but had expressly
provided that a defendant establish "cause" for the failure to ob-
ject to the grand jury in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
"no more lenient standard of waiver should apply to a claim
raised three years after conviction simply because the claim is as-
serted by way of collateral attack rather than in the criminal pro-
ceeding itself."8 7
Although Davis represents the first inroad on Fay's deliberate
bypass standard, the decision is understandable if confined to the
justification given it by the Court. Unfortunately, as will be seen
in Francis v. Henderson,88 the Court did not limit the cause re-
quirement of Davis to cases involving congressional intent as
manifested by express statutory provisions.
On May 3, 1976, the Court decided Estelle v. Williams 89 and
Francis v. Henderson.90 In Williams the Court held that the
waiver of certain due process rights does not require a knowing
and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege as
mandated by Zerbst.91 Rather, as long as the trial court does not
compel a defendant to give up his rights, he will be deemed to
have waived them if he failed to assert them. Compulsion, then,
became the focal point in determining waiver.
Rule 12(b) (2) provides in pertinent part that "defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment
... may be raised only by motion before trial" and that failure to present
such defenses or objecting "constitutes a waiver thereof, but the courtfor
cause shown may grant relief from the waiver."
411 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 240-41.
86. Id. at 240.
87. Id. at 241.
88. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
89. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
90. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
91. 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
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Williams involved a pretrial detainee who was unable to post
bond and hence was tried in his jail clothes, even though he had
asked his jailers to allow him to wear his civilian clothes at trial.
Neither Williams nor his appointed counsel objected to the trial
judge when the request was denied. Both thought such an objec-
tion would have been futile in light of the regular practice in
Texas of trying indigents in prison garb.92
On certiorari the Supreme Court held that while compelling an
accused to stand trial in jail clothes violated due process, absent
compulsion by the court93 no due process violation occurs. This
holding is particularly enigmatic in that the Court expounded at
length on the prejudicial effect of an accused being tried in cloth-
ing distinctly marked as prison issue,94 yet still rejected Williams'
argument that he had been denied due process.
Even more disturbing is the way in which the Court avoided all
reference to Zerbst or Fay in establishing compulsion as the key
to determining waiver. The Court could just as easily have estab-
lished a prophylactic procedure in the form of "Williams warn-
ings" whereby a trial judge could readily determine whether an
accused wished to stand trial in his jail clothing. By focusing on
compulsion, however, the Court not only supplanted the estab-
lished inquiry into whether the accused had voluntarily relin-
quished known rights, but also transferred the burden of proof to
the defendant. Whereas before Williams the state bore the bur-
den of proving knowing and voluntary waiver, after Williams, the
accused bears the burden of establishing compulsion.
In Francis v. Henderson,95 the Court extended the cause re-
quirement of Davis to state prisoners challenging the composition
of the grand jury on habeas corpus, and further added the re-
quirement that the petitioner also demonstrate actual prejudice
resulting thereby.96
92. Id. at 510-11.
93. The Court rejected the argument that Williams was compelled to wear jail
clothing by state correctional officials and hence that the state action requirement
for the fourteenth amendment due process violation had been met. Id. at 501.
94. Id. at 503-06. For example, the Court stated that "the constant reminder of
the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a
juror's judgment. The defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence
throughout the trial that,. . . an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible
factors coming into play." Id. at 504-05.
95. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
96. Id- at 542.
Francis, a seventeen-year-old black youth, was convicted of fel-
ony murder through extremely unusual circumstances. Francis
and three confederates, all considerably older than he, had at-
tempted to rob a small store, and in an ensuing gun battle with
the owners one of the robbers was shot and killed. Francis had
not been armed, yet he was charged with felony murder for the
death of his confederate. This was the first time such a charge
had been leveled against anyone in the state's history.97
Francis, an indigent, was assigned a court-appointed attorney
who had not practiced criminal law in fifteen years, had never
handled a capital case and who received no compensation for his
meager effort. 98 For some reason counsel did not plea Francis to
a lesser charge as had the other defendants, nor did counsel con-
sider challenging the composition of the grand jury which alleg-
edly excluded all blacks. Francis received a life sentence
following conviction. His confederates received only eight-year
terms.
In reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which had
granted Francis' writ, the Supreme Court held that it could per-
ceive no reason why state prisoners challenging the composition
of the grand jury on habeas corpus should be entitled to any more
lenient standard than federal prisoners making the same chal-
lenge and whose claims were controlled by Davis. In an ex-
traordinary example of juristic revisionism, the Court then held
that since Davis required a federal prisoner to demonstrate both
cause and prejudice before a federal court could entertain claims
of unconstitutional composition of the grand jury on habeas
corpus, the doctrines of federalism and comity demanded no less
of state prisoners.9 9
In reaching this result the Court in Francis avoided any refer-
ence to the rationale underlying the decision in Davis. The Davis
Court had based its decision on express congressional intent as
manifested by specific statutory language. These factors were al-
together missing in Francis, a case which should have been con-
trolled by Fay's deliberate bypass standard. The failure to even
acknowledge this departure from Fay is staggering. As Justice
Brennan noted in dissent, if the Court is no longer going to ad-
here to the holding of Fay "it has an 'institutional duty' to say so
forthrightly and to explain why some other standard is to be
applied.'100
97. Id. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 554-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 541.
100. Id. at 547 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In the Term following Williams and Francis, the Court in Wain-
wright v. Sykes101 made clear that the substitution of the "cause
and prejudice" standard for the "deliberate bypass" test would
not be confined to claims addressed to the make-up of the grand
jury. Petitioner Sykes was arrested for murder. Although he was
given Miranda warnings 0 2 there was evidence that he was so in-
toxicated that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
fifth amendment rights when he subsequently confessed to the
police. For unknown reasons, Sykes' attorney did not attempt to
suppress the confession. Following his conviction for third degree
murder, Sykes filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he
had been denied his Miranda rights. 03
Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ordered the case remanded to determine the question of
voluntariness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sykes'
failure to raise the Miranda claim at trial precluded him from ob-
taining review before a federal habeas court absent a showing of
cause and actual prejudice. Because Sykes did not offer any evi-
dence on the cause requirement, his petition was dismissed.104
In enunciating an expanded cause and prejudice standard, the
Court studiously avoided any attempt to give guidance as to the
meaning of those terms. The Court per Justice Rehnquist merely
stated that "whatever precise content may be given those terms
by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elabo-
ration that they do not exist here." 0 5 As one commentator noted
shortly after the decision in Sykes, the only "precise content" dis-
cernible from this case "would unquestionably have to include
the element of harshness."' 06
The decisions in Davis, Williams, Francis and Sykes left the
law of habeas corpus in the following state. Compliance with
state procedural law was to be given "more respect" than was af-
101. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
102. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
103. 433 U.S. 72, 75 (1977).
104. The Court in Engle v. Isaac noted, moreover, that the type of claims raised
by the petitioner in Sykes, that is, a claim for suppression of evidence, does not
affect the truthfinding function at trial. Hence, procedural defects in the Sykes
context would presumably not result in miscarriages of justice. 102 S. Ct. 1558,
1572 (1982).
105. 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977). The Court did not elaborate as to what factors in-
spired this confidence.
106. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by Reasonably In-
competent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341, 448 (1978).
forded by Fay v. Noia.107 The states' interest in finality and the
dual concerns of federalism and comity were at least on equal
footing, if not preferred over the interest in the correct resolution
of federal constitutional rights. The failure to object at trial would
preclude federal habeas review on procedures not affecting the
determination of guilt or innocence by the trier of fact unless the
petitioner could meet the requirement of establishing both cause
and prejudice-whatever those nebulous terms meant. The
waiver standard enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst would now only
apply to such non-'trial type" decisions as whether to plead
guilty, and whether to request counsel which, obviously, only the
defendant can make.
THE DELIBERATE BYPASS STANDARD IS DEAD: LONG LIVE IsAAc
Following the 1977 decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court
remained silent for five years on the issue of procedural default
and the precise content of the newly enunciated cause and
prejudice standards. Then in April 1982 the newest member of
the Court, Justice O'Connor, announced the decision in Engle v.
Isaac,08 in which the deliberate bypass doctrine of Fay v. Noia
was finally put to rest.
Engle v. Isaac represented a consolidation of three Ohio cases,
all involving the affirmative defense of self-defense. For "over a
century" the state of Ohio had required the defendant in a crimi-
nal case to bear the burden of establishing affirmative defenses
by a preponderance of the evidence.10 9 In 1973 the Ohio Legisla-
ture enacted section 2901.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code Anno-
tated which became effective on January 1, 1974.110 That section
provided that "[e]very person accused of an offense is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
burden of proof is on the prosecution. The burden of going for-
ward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is on the
accused."11'
For two years following the enactment of section 2901.05(A), the
courts of Ohio presumed that the statute had worked no change
in Ohio's traditional rule of requiring the accused to bear both the
burden of producing evidence, and the burden of persuasion
when raising afflrmative defenses. In fact, as late as July 2, 1975,
the Ohio Supreme Court, in construing section 2901.05(A), held
107. 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
108. 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
109. Id. at 1562.
110. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Baldwin 1982).
111. 102 S. Ct. at 1562-63.
[voL. 20: 371, 1983] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
that "self-defense is an affirmative defense, which must be estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence.""12 One year later,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed itself, and in State v.
Robinson"13 held that "[t]he obvious meaning of R.C. 2901.05(A)
is that the state bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt through the trial, and that this burden does not shift to the
defendant."114 Thus, once the defendant produces "evidence of a
nature and quality sufficient to raise the issue""15 of an affirina-
tive defense, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving such
a defense beyond a reasonable doubt.116
All three respondents in Engle v. Isaac were convicted after the
enactment of section 2901.05(A), but before the decision in Robin-
son. At their trials none of them objected to the jury instructions
regarding burden of proof. Following the decision in Robinson all
three brought habeas petitions to a federal district court alleging
that they had been denied due process of law. The gist of their
argument was that although a state may shift the burden of per-
suasion on affirmative defenses to the defendant in a criminal
case without violating due process,"17 once the state assumes the
burden of disproving affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable
doubt,118 it cannot arbitrarily assign the burden of persuasion to
particular defendants without violating that fundamental fairness
which the due process clause guarantees."19
The district court dismissed the petitions without reaching the
merits on the grounds that Sykes' cause and prejudice standard
112. State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 330 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1975). In support
of the argument that it was indeed futile to object to the jury instructions regard-
ing burdens of proof on affirmative defenses, note that respondent Isaac's trial
took place in September 1975, only two months after the high court in Ohio
decided Rogers. Note further that while respondents Hughes and Bell were tried
before the decision in Rogers (January and April 1975 respectively), the Ohio
Supreme Court had only two years earlier rejected a constitutional attack on
Ohio's affirmative defense rule in State v. Seliskar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 95, 298 N.E.2d 582
(1973).
113. 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
114. Id. at 110, 351 N.E.2d at 93.
115. Id. at 111-12, 351 N.E.2d at 94.
116. Id. at 110, 351 N.E.2d at 93.
117. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952).
118. The State of Ohio did this in enacting Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (A)
(Baldwin 1982).
119. See, e.g., Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) ("[t]he right to a fair
trial is a fundamental liberty. secured by the fourteenth amendment").
barred respondents from obtaining federal review of their
claims. 120 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' 2 1 That
court found that even if the Sykes cause and prejudice standard
should control, a fact which the court was not willing to concede,
the respondents had satisfied both requirements. The futility of
objecting to such an established procedure supplied adequate
cause, and prejudice was "clear"122 because the burden of proof is
a critical element of fact-finding and the respondents had made a
substantial issue of self-defense.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals and dismissed the petitions.123 The Court held first that the
cause and prejudice standard enunciated in Sykes and up to that
time restricted to errors not affecting the fact-finding process
would now apply to all cases involving procedural default, even
where the error complained of goes to the heart of the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence. The Court then applied the Sykes
standard to the cases before it. Although the Court conceded that
respondents had indeed been prejudiced by the erroneous shift-
ing of the burden of persuasion on the issue of self-defense,124 the
Court rejected respondents' arguments regarding cause.125 This
is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that, as in Sykes, the
Court again refrained from shedding any light on the meaning of
the terms "cause" and "prejudice." Although the Court went to
some lengths to say what cause was not,126 this failure to define
its own standard cannot be justified. It allows the court to play
cat-and-mouse with state prisoners whose counsel failed to raise
necessary objections at their trials. For even after Engle v. Isaac
the only thing that can be predicted concerning the meaning of
those terms is that whatever justification a state prisoner proffers
will not suffice.
Finally, the Court held that while procedural default will bar
federal habeas review of state prisoners' claims absent a showing
of cause and prejudice, there still exists a safety valve for those
inmates whose incarcerations are "fundamentally unjust."127 Al-
though the court did not explain how this safety valve would
120. 102 S. Ct. at 1565.
121. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
122. Id. at 1134.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 1575.
124. Id. at 1567 n.19, 1575.
125. See supra text accompanying footnotes 17-21 for a discussion of "cause."
126. See, e.g., 102 S. Ct. at 1573, where the Court states, "[w]e need not decide
whether the novelty of a constitutional claim ever establishes cause for a failure to
object." It would appear, however, that this is precisely the sort of problem which
the Court should have reached in Engle v. Isaac.
127. Id. at 1575.
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function, or what standard of review it would be governed by, or
even what the term meant, the Court stated that it was "confident
that victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice"128 would be
afforded relief.
The decision in Isaac thus culminated the process begun in
1973 with Davis v. United States of eliminating the requirement
that the accused be aware of and consent to the loss of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights as required under Fay v. Noia. Concerns
over the inadvertent loss of constitutional rights were subjugated
to the paramount concerns of judicial efficiency, finality, federal-
ism and comity. In less than ten years the Court has thus come
full circle from a position of substance over form, to one of form
over substance; from a system requiring knowing and intelligent
waivers, to a virtually airtight system of forfeitures.
The Court proffered a number of reasons 129 in support of its de-
cision to extend the cause and prejudice standard across the
board to all cases involving procedural default, but the primary
justifications were those of judicial efficiency and finality. The
Court stated that the "costs" 3 0 of the Great Writ were simply far
too high under the old (pre-Isaac) system in terms of extending
litigation over issues that should have been settled at trial into
the already overcrowded federal docket. By "frustrating" the in-
terests in putting "'an end to litigation'.., the writ undermines
the usual principles of finality." 3 1
The irony of Isaac, however, is that not only will it fail to
achieve its goals of reducing the number of collateral issues sub-
ject to litigation and furthering the cause of finality, but it will ac-
tually increase the number of collateral issues subject to appeal.
It does so in a number of ways. First, under the rule in Isaac, the
Court, inadvertently or otherwise, has established a duplicative
procedure for federal courts reviewing habeas petitions in which
the petitioner has been guilty of procedural default. Federal
courts must now first conduct a hearing on the issues of cause
and prejudice. Only if the court is satisfied that both prongs of
this standard have been met can it then consider the merits of the
128. Id.
129. The dissent referred to these as "sentiments in reasons' clothing." Id. at
1581 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. The Court uses the word "costs" no fewer than five times in two pages
while making its case against "the Great Writ." See id. at 1571-72.
131. Id. at 1571.
underlying claim. Note, however, that an inquiry into the issue of
prejudice necessarily involves an examination into the merits of
the petition: prejudice cannot be determined in a vacuum.
Should the court reject the petitioner's offer of proof on cause and
prejudice, the second prong of the procedure is triggered-the
fundamental miscarriage of justice prong. For even if the peti-
tioner is unable to establish cause and prejudice, a federal habeas
court must grant relief where a fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice would otherwise occur.
This procedure is grossly inefficient, and increases by a factor
of four the number of issues subject to appeal irrespective of how
the district court resolves the claim.132 First, either the state or
the petitioner will appeal the determination regarding whether
the latter has met the threshold requirements of establishing
cause and prejudice. The same would be true regarding the fun-
damental miscarriage of justice issue. Also, petitioners whose
claims are precluded from federal review for failure to satisfy the
cause and prejudice standard will now file claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.133 After all, it was counsel's failure to ob-
ject that is responsible for their predicament. Finally, if the dis-
trict court decides that both cause and prejudice have been
demonstrated, any ruling on the merits will be subject to appeal
and thus, further litigation.
Not only are the goals of judicial efficiency and finality frus-
trated by this duplicative procedure, they are further undermined
by Isaac's implicit command to the defense bar to object to every
aspect of the trial no matter how futile or inchoate the claim, no
matter how established the procedure of the court. While such a
practice obviously places defense counsel in an untenable posi-
tion tactically, worse yet, for purposes of finality and efficiency,
this practice will result in increasing the workload of the state
courts on appeal as well as the federal courts on habeas. For
under this system, counsel will never be guilty of procedural de-
fault, and thus his client will be eligible for plenary federal
review.
The decision in Isaac, however, does not rest solely on the doc-
trines of finality and judicial efficiency. The Court also supports
its decision with arguments regarding federalism and comity.
132. The Court could have avoided a great deal of this by attempting to give
"content" to the meaning of the terms "cause," "prejudice," and "fundamental
miscarriage of justice," even if the content was not so "precise."
133. See, e.g., Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of
Counse" The Supreme Court Has Work To Do, 31 STAN. L RFv. 1 (1978); Note, At-
torney Error as "Cause" Under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Case for a Reasonable-
ness Standard After Washington v. Doumes, 67 VA. L. REv. 415 (1981).
[voL. 20: 371, 1983] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Justice O'Connor states that "the Great Writ imposes special
costs on our federal system,"'13 4 especially in that issuance of the
writ "exacts an extra charge by undercutting the State's ability to
enforce its procedural rules."135
Although the initial response to this argument is that the Con-
stitution is the supreme law of the land136 and hence the concern
over the states' ability to enforce their procedural rules is de
minimis, the real problem with the Court's arguments concerning
federalism and comity in the context of procedural default is that
they are misdirected. If the underlying policy of these two doc-
trines is that federal intrusions into state court determinations
provide an unnecessary source of friction, a system of forfeiture,
such as that on which Isaac is premised, aggravates this friction.
Under Isaac, a federal court may review the federal claims of a
state prisoner only if they have been properly preserved on the
record. This means that a federal court can review a claim on
habeas only after two or three tiers of state courts have rendered
a decision on the merits. Thus, where there has been no proce-
dural default, a decision by a federal habeas court that a claim is
meritorious is arguably much more intrusive, for such a finding
necessarily tells at least two, and generally three state courts that
their resolution of the issue was erroneous. But if petitioner's
counsel failed to object to an aspect of the trial in which funda-
mental federal rights were violated, a decision by a federal court
on habeas that the petitioner was indeed denied such federal
rights is a decision written on a clean slate, that is, it involves no
such overruling of state court determinations in that the state
courts have declined to even hear the issue.
Finally, the Court attempts to bolster its opinion with the "sen-
tentious"137 repetition of the "sandbagging" argument first raised
by Justice Rehnquist in Wainwright v. Sykes.138 The gist of this
argument is that there is somehow an advantage to be gained by
withholding a valid defense from the trier of fact, that is, that sly
defense counsel will "deliberately choose to withhold a claim [at
trial] in order to 'sandbag'-to gamble on accquittal while saving
134. 102 S. Ct. at 1571.
135. Id. at 1572.
136. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 1581 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off.,,139 There-
fore, the argument goes, only by enforcing a strict system of for-
feitures will the Court be able to eliminate this type of
underhanded defense strategy.
There are a number of serious objections to the argument that
the imposition of an airtight system of forfeitures is justified on
the grounds that it will help prevent "sandbagging." The first is
that such an argument offends notions of common sense. It pre-
supposes not only crafty and calculating defense counsel, but also
a defendant who is willing to gamble on incredible stakes. The
sandbagging argument suggests that there are numbers of de-
fendants who are willing to go to prison in order to pull out their
ace in the hole on habeas corpus. Lest it be forgotten, section
2254 requires state prisoners to exhaust all available remedies
before being eligible to even petition for habeas relief. This is a
time-consuming task. Take the example of respondent Isaac in
the case at bar. Isaac's trial took place in September 1975. Final
disposition of his habeas petition took place in April 1982, nearly
seven years later. To suggest that many persons exist who are
willing to take such a "gamble" is incredulous.
In addition, a defendant whose attorney deliberately withheld a
valid constitutional claim at trial in order to bring it out on habeas
corpus would be barred from obtaining federal review even under
Fay v. Noia. Such a calculating maneuver would constitute the
sort of deliberate bypass for strategic or tactical reasons ad-
dressed in Fay.4 0
Finally, "no rational lawyer would risk the 'sandbagging' feared
by the Court."141 The primary goal at trial, from the defendant's
point of view, is to obtain an acquittal. Sandbagging can do noth-
ing but hurt a client's case. First, withholding a valid constitu-
tional claim at trial increases the likelihood of conviction. This is
true whether the claim relates to evidence that would otherwise
be excluded, or whether it relates to an erroneous allocation of
the burden of proof. Further, by sandbagging, counsel for the de-
fense would thus have forfeited all opportunities for state appel-
late review as well as all opportunities for federal habeas review
unless he or she could deceive a federal habeas court by convinc-
ing the judge that he or she had not deliberately bypassed the
state procedures. In short, the sandbagging argument raised by
the Court is without merit.142
139. 102 S. Ct. at 1572 n.34.
140. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
141. 102 S. Ct. at 1581 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Actually the Court raises two minor arguments in addition to those of
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CONCLUSION
Resolution of the conflicting interests involved when a state
prisoner challenges his conviction by means of federal habeas
corpus presents no easy task. Valid arguments exist both for and
against an expanded writ. In the balance, however, the argu-
ments in support of a restrictive writ, which the Burger Court has
wholeheartedly embraced as evidenced by the decisions from Da-
vis to Isaac, represent outcome determinative rather than philo-
sophical or doctrinal concerns. It has here been argued that
continued reliance on such factors as finality, judicial efficiency,
federalism, and comity will ultimately undermine the significance
of the Constitution as a symbol for the embodiment of the ideal
society. It has further been contended that the flood argument,
raised by courts and commentators alike, is a sham used to justify
judicial alienation of a class of persons, namely prisoners, who
lack the political clout to remedy their plight. It is only hoped
that the Court in Isaac has gone as far as it will in eviscerating
the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus.
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finality, judicial efficiency, federalism, comity and sandbagging in support of its de-
cision. We are told that liberal allowance of the writ "degrades the prominence of
the trial itself," 102 S. Ct. at 1571, and that "writs of habeas corpus frequently cost
society the right to punish admitted offenders." Id.
The first of these arguments is, upon closer inspection, a subset of the sandbag-
ging argument and hence is subject to the analysis above. As for the second argu-
ment, it is absolutely irrelevant to the case at hand. Not one of the three
respondents in Isaac is an "admitted offender." To the contrary, all three have
urged that they are not guilty of the crimes with which they have been charged for
the reason that they acted in self-defense.

